Dan Selbo's election as NALC Bishop

[mj4]

If Lutherans have a compelling need to codify, confessionally, just which Scriptures are or are not canonical they should simply adopt the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion.

Hmm..., except for all the Calvinist and Zwinglian stuff in there.

[Svensen]

If Lutherans have a compelling need to codify, confessionally, just which Scriptures are or are not canonical they should simply adopt the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion.

Seems to me Lutherans have a compelling need not to codify which scriptures are canonical.

[peterm]

I love doctrine. I often have doctrine for breakfast or (well, sometimes it's for lunch).

Aye, there's egg and bacon; egg sausage and bacon; egg and doctrine; egg bacon and doctrine; egg bacon sausage and doctrine; doctrine bacon sausage and doctrine; doctrine egg doctrine doctrine bacon and doctrine; doctrine sausage doctrine doctrine bacon doctrine tomato and doctrine...nudge, nudge, wink, wink.

Can I get the eggs, sausage, and doctrine without the doctrine?

[SomeoneWrites]

Like everyone else, you stand in the midst of a hermeneutical theory as you read scripture; you do not stand outside of any pre-conceived notions.

As usual, I appreciate your point, and I think you are correct.  I understand that the above statement is in context to nobody standing outside of any pre-conceived notions.  At the same time I think its connected to what Brian Stoffregen was saying about everyone making human interpretations.  I usually see the case being made against Brian Stoffregen, but points about preconceptions don't seem to come up in discussions between EO/RC/LCMS in this forum. 

Anyways,  I do appreciate the way you phrased what you did in what I quoted.  I think it deserves more attention. 

[TERJr]

Like everyone else, you stand in the midst of a hermeneutical theory as you read scripture; you do not stand outside of any pre-conceived notions.

As usual, I appreciate your point, and I think you are correct.  I understand that the above statement is in context to nobody standing outside of any pre-conceived notions.  At the same time I think its connected to what Brian Stoffregen was saying about everyone making human interpretations.  I usually see the case being made against Brian Stoffregen, but points about preconceptions don't seem to come up in discussions between EO/RC/LCMS in this forum. 

Anyways,  I do appreciate the way you phrased what you did in what I quoted.  I think it deserves more attention.

The hermeneutic of suspicion seems to be only a one way street. Rarely will the suspicious apply it to themselves.

[Brian Stoffregen]

Like everyone else, you stand in the midst of a hermeneutical theory as you read scripture; you do not stand outside of any pre-conceived notions.

As usual, I appreciate your point, and I think you are correct.  I understand that the above statement is in context to nobody standing outside of any pre-conceived notions.  At the same time I think its connected to what Brian Stoffregen was saying about everyone making human interpretations.  I usually see the case being made against Brian Stoffregen, but points about preconceptions don't seem to come up in discussions between EO/RC/LCMS in this forum. 

Anyways,  I do appreciate the way you phrased what you did in what I quoted.  I think it deserves more attention.

It seems to me that there was a very strong preconception about the RC's understanding of justification and works in our discussion about them. It couldn't be like the way Lutherans deal with James's comments about works.

[Brian Stoffregen]

Like everyone else, you stand in the midst of a hermeneutical theory as you read scripture; you do not stand outside of any pre-conceived notions.

As usual, I appreciate your point, and I think you are correct.  I understand that the above statement is in context to nobody standing outside of any pre-conceived notions.  At the same time I think its connected to what Brian Stoffregen was saying about everyone making human interpretations.  I usually see the case being made against Brian Stoffregen, but points about preconceptions don't seem to come up in discussions between EO/RC/LCMS in this forum. 

Anyways,  I do appreciate the way you phrased what you did in what I quoted.  I think it deserves more attention.

The hermeneutic of suspicion seems to be only a one way street. Rarely will the suspicious apply it to themselves.

Of course some of us apply it to ourselves. We recognize that the writer may not have meant exactly what was said, e.g., using metaphors, exaggerations, symbolisms, etc.


The articles posted about harmonizing the women at the tomb falls quite under a hermeneutic of suspicion, e.g., Matthew knew there were two angels, but only talked about one of them. In my mind, that explanation follows more the hermeneutic of suspicion than those who accept the idea that Matthew's source only talked about one angel.


I'm using the following definition of hermeneutic of suspicion:


https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199336593.001.0001/acprof-9780199336593-chapter-4

[TERJr]

There isn't enough bourbon in Kentucky for this...

[SomeoneWrites]

There isn't enough bourbon in Kentucky for this...

I don't see why. 

[D. Engebretson]

Like everyone else, you stand in the midst of a hermeneutical theory as you read scripture; you do not stand outside of any pre-conceived notions.

As usual, I appreciate your point, and I think you are correct.  I understand that the above statement is in context to nobody standing outside of any pre-conceived notions.  At the same time I think its connected to what Brian Stoffregen was saying about everyone making human interpretations.  I usually see the case being made against Brian Stoffregen, but points about preconceptions don't seem to come up in discussions between EO/RC/LCMS in this forum. 

Anyways,  I do appreciate the way you phrased what you did in what I quoted.  I think it deserves more attention.

The hermeneutic of suspicion seems to be only a one way street. Rarely will the suspicious apply it to themselves.

Of course some of us apply it to ourselves. We recognize that the writer may not have meant exactly what was said, e.g., using metaphors, exaggerations, symbolisms, etc.


The articles posted about harmonizing the women at the tomb falls quite under a hermeneutic of suspicion, e.g., Matthew knew there were two angels, but only talked about one of them. In my mind, that explanation follows more the hermeneutic of suspicion than those who accept the idea that Matthew's source only talked about one angel.


I'm using the following definition of hermeneutic of suspicion:


https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199336593.001.0001/acprof-9780199336593-chapter-4

From your linked site:
The hermeneutic of suspicion can, however, be misused and overused. Unbridled, it leads to absurdities, as in the assumption that any text involving the miraculous must be unhistorical, or the preposterous notion that Jesus, misunderstood by those who shared his language, culture, and religion, is now for the first time to be truly understood by scholars who share none of these things.

[SomeoneWrites]

Like everyone else, you stand in the midst of a hermeneutical theory as you read scripture; you do not stand outside of any pre-conceived notions.

As usual, I appreciate your point, and I think you are correct.  I understand that the above statement is in context to nobody standing outside of any pre-conceived notions.  At the same time I think its connected to what Brian Stoffregen was saying about everyone making human interpretations.  I usually see the case being made against Brian Stoffregen, but points about preconceptions don't seem to come up in discussions between EO/RC/LCMS in this forum. 

Anyways,  I do appreciate the way you phrased what you did in what I quoted.  I think it deserves more attention.

The hermeneutic of suspicion seems to be only a one way street. Rarely will the suspicious apply it to themselves.

Of course some of us apply it to ourselves. We recognize that the writer may not have meant exactly what was said, e.g., using metaphors, exaggerations, symbolisms, etc.


The articles posted about harmonizing the women at the tomb falls quite under a hermeneutic of suspicion, e.g., Matthew knew there were two angels, but only talked about one of them. In my mind, that explanation follows more the hermeneutic of suspicion than those who accept the idea that Matthew's source only talked about one angel.


I'm using the following definition of hermeneutic of suspicion:


https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199336593.001.0001/acprof-9780199336593-chapter-4

From your linked site:
The hermeneutic of suspicion can, however, be misused and overused. Unbridled, it leads to absurdities, as in the assumption that any text involving the miraculous must be unhistorical, or the preposterous notion that Jesus, misunderstood by those who shared his language, culture, and religion, is now for the first time to be truly understood by scholars who share none of these things.

I admit I was surprised to see opinion inserted into a definition in that way.

[Brian Stoffregen]

From your linked site:
The hermeneutic of suspicion can, however, be misused and overused. Unbridled, it leads to absurdities, as in the assumption that any text involving the miraculous must be unhistorical, or the preposterous notion that Jesus, misunderstood by those who shared his language, culture, and religion, is now for the first time to be truly understood by scholars who share none of these things.

I'm suggesting that the "solutions" offered to the differences in the resurrection accounts are doing the same thing. They "suspect" that all the accounts have to agree, and they impose their ideology onto the text to have it say more than it actually says.

[peter_speckhard]

From your linked site:
The hermeneutic of suspicion can, however, be misused and overused. Unbridled, it leads to absurdities, as in the assumption that any text involving the miraculous must be unhistorical, or the preposterous notion that Jesus, misunderstood by those who shared his language, culture, and religion, is now for the first time to be truly understood by scholars who share none of these things.

I'm suggesting that the "solutions" offered to the differences in the resurrection accounts are doing the same thing. They "suspect" that all the accounts have to agree, and they impose their ideology onto the text to have it say more than it actually says.

What "it actually says" is something that cannot possible be determined apart from prior hermeneutical principles. It is just squiggles on a page or vibrations in the air unless there is some agreement as to what it signifies. Such agreement requires the intent of the speaker, the understanding of the listener, and the mutual community that establishes the "rules," so to speak.

Interpreting and applying the words of a judicial order requires the extra-textual knowledge that it is a judicial order. If the text itself claims to be a judicial order, properly interpreting and applying it means believing that claim. There is no "what the text actually says" completely divorced from that framework.

People who read the Bible as something other than the Word of God never arrive at "what it actually says." They need the Holy Spirit to intervene.

[Brian Stoffregen]

What "it actually says" is something that cannot possible be determined apart from prior hermeneutical principles. It is just squiggles on a page or vibrations in the air unless there is some agreement as to what it signifies.

What "it actually says" are those squiggles on a page. They are words.

Such agreement requires the intent of the speaker, the understanding of the listener, and the mutual community that establishes the "rules," so to speak.

What you are describing is the meaning(s) of those squiggles on a page or the vibrations in the air. That is a step beyond recognizing what the words are.

Interpreting and applying the words of a judicial order requires the extra-textual knowledge that it is a judicial order. If the text itself claims to be a judicial order, properly interpreting and applying it means believing that claim. There is no "what the text actually says" completely divorced from that framework.

John 3:16 says: Οὕτως γὰρ ἠγάπησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον, ὥστε τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ ἔδωκεν, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν μὴ ἀπόληται ἀλλ' ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον.


Would you argue that it doesn't say that? Agreeing that those are the words in that verse does not require any extra-textual knowledge. It simply requires the text. For someone with no knowledge of Greek, they are just scribbles on a page with no meaning; but that doesn't change the fact that that's what the text says. That's what's written in the book.

Once one seeks to decipher those scribbles, to give meaning to them, it requires extra-biblical knowledge, e.g., what each of those words mean? What grammar is being employed? How might we express the same ideas in English?

People who read the Bible as something other than the Word of God never arrive at "what it actually says." They need the Holy Spirit to intervene.

I make a distinction between "what it actually says" and "what it means". You don't seem to make that difference. Or perhaps better expressed: "The words that God has given us" vs. "The meaning(s) of the words God has given us."


For instance, God has given us the word, ἠγάπησεν, in the above verse. It is the third person singular aorist indicative active form of ἀγαπάω. That is what I mean by "what it says."


Seeking the meaning(s) of ἀγαπάω and which ones best apply in this sentence and how to express the aorist tense in English is moving to the next step.


τὸν κόσμον are words given to us in the verse. It is the object of God's ἠγάπησεν. Seeing the word in the text is step one. Biases have no affect on noting the words that are in the text. Looking up κόσμος in BDAG and noting that there are 8 different definitions is step two. Deciding on which definition(s) best fits this context is step three - and one's biases certainly come into play with such decisions.

[peter_speckhard]

That isn't how language works. Being able to distinguish squiggles from words is itself an interpretive act. There is no knowing what the words are prior to an interpretative act and a community, even if the community is simply the publishers of dictionaries.