I had hoped, though, for some sort of principle for when science and reason should be allowed to trump divine revelation and when they shouldn't. God's command out of nothing and I trust that's true and--as a matter of faith--isn't provable.
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I'm interested in understanding on what basis people who believe that Jesus was conceived by the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin, did a bunch of miracles then was crucified, died, and rose from the dead reject the revelation of the same Scriptures concerning the creation of the universe. What is the rationale for doing so, or is it just a matter of personal preference and choice?
This is an excellent question, LCMS87. I'm not sure there is any "principle" that can be clearly articulated to distinguish "when science and reason should be allowed to trump divine revelation and when they shouldn't." To come at it from the other direction: it's rather like asking for a principle to distinguish when we should reject what science says when it comes to contemporary versions of Neo-Darwinian evolution theory from when we should accept what science says when it comes to medicine or communications technology. Some folks scoff at the pretensions of scientific claims regarding contemporary evolutionary theory, but those same folks routinely accept what science says when undergoing medical diagnoses. Is there a principle at work here, one that allows us to delineate clearly and consistently when science should be taken seriously, and when it should not? I can't find one. Why should I accept ordinary medical science, but not ordinary evolutionary science? I dunno. Likewise, I'm not sure there is a definitive principle or basis for declaring what are the conditions under which we may rely on science, and what are the conditions under which we may rely on revelation.
I suspect that Pr. Staneck may be offering the most reliable way to discern how to make such distinctions. As the theology of the catholic tradition of western Christianity has matured over the past couple of millennia, it appears the biblical teaching that grounds Christology and soteriology have a central role in that theology. Other biblical teachings (such as a doctrine of creation) may play a supporting role, but they are neither central, nor adiaphora. When Luther portrayed the doctrine of justification by grace through faith as implying, "if this article stands the church stands; if this article collapses, the church collapses," he wasn't quoting scripture; he was doing theology. Quoting scripture is not the same thing as doing theology. But there is no clear principle that marks off the decisive divide between the conditions under which doing theology trumps quoting scripture, or vice versa.
I've found useful a general heuristic device offered by the philosopher W.V.O. Quine (he is only one of several who have suggested this same analogy). Quine describes our intellectual convictions ("beliefs") as resembling a web, like a spider's web. The threads that are closest to the center are the strongest, and most resistant to being disrupted. The threads of the web that are furthest from the center, near the periphery of the entire web, are the most vulnerable to being torn loose and damaged. But as long as "the center holds," the web can retain its integrity. In the same way, there is often no single principle, in science or theology, that can finally define what can stay and what can go. But in Christian theology, as long as "the center holds," the integrity of our confession remains intact. And, I am convinced, it is the Spirit, working through the Church, that has held "the center" together in Christian theology the past 2,000 years.
Tom Pearson